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COMMENT
CRIMINALS BY NECESSITY: THE AMERICAN
HOMELESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Lisa M. Kline†
Remember when homelessness itself was not a crime, until
the homeless made themselves too visible by panhandling at
ATMs? Only when they made affluent people uncomfortable
were they locked up . . . . The criminalization of homelessness—
one of the ways this society gets rid of the poor as well as a
certain number of people with psychiatric disabilities—removes
the daily reminders of the obvious injustice of the very existence
of homelessness in the richest country in the world.1
I. INTRODUCTION
As the economic condition of the nation worsens, the plight of the
American homeless population continues to deteriorate. Since the
beginning of the current recession, families across the nation have been
forced into poverty. Between April of 2008 and April of 2009, there was a
32% increase in foreclosures nationwide.2 Over six million jobs have been
lost since the economic downturn, and that number continues to grow every
day.3 In fact, the national unemployment rate peaked in October of 2009; at
over 10%—its highest point since 1983.4 Often, the cost of living prevents
these people from getting back on their feet. In every state, more than
minimum wage is required to afford a one- or two-bedroom apartment at
Fair Market Rent,5 making it virtually impossible for an entire fragment of
†
Managing Editor of Student Works, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 5.
J.D. Candidate (2011); Liberty University School of Law; B.A. Cedarville University. For
Edward Kline—my dad, best friend, role model, and editor-in-chief.
1. TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND
WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT 259 (1999).
2. Why Are People Homeless?, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS,
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/Why.pdf (July, 2009).
3. Id.
4. Peter S. Goodman, U.S. Unemployment Rate Hits 10.2%, Highest in 26 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/business/
economy/07jobs.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
5. Fair Market Rent is the “amount needed to rent privately owned, decent, safe, and
sanitary rental housing of a modest (non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities.” Final Fair
Market Rents for Fiscal Year 2010 for the Housing Choice Voucher Program and Moderate
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society to obtain permanent housing.6 Without any other options, many of
these families have had to move to the streets and shelters.
It is estimated that over 12% of the nation’s population lives in poverty.7
These individuals, if not already homeless, are teetering on the edge of
homelessness.8 One car accident, one job loss, or one health issue would
send any one of these people to the street in a matter of days.
As the problem of homelessness grows, so do laws criminalizing
homeless activities. In a 2009 report, the National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty surveyed 235 cities across the nation and
compiled information about city ordinances criminalizing homelessness.9
Of those 235 cities, 33% prohibit “camping” in particular public places,
30% prohibit sleeping or lying in public places, 47% prohibit loitering in
public areas, and 47% prohibit begging in particular public places.10 These
laws are sometimes enforced selectively and are usually enforced without
mercy.
When confronted with the issue of homelessness, many people respond
with either apathy or disgust. The first images that spring to mind are those
of drunken, lazy people who choose not to work. However, many times,
that is simply not the case. Many people thrust into poverty today have no
other option, yet they are viewed as failures too lazy to contribute to
society. Throughout our nation’s short history, the homeless and working
poor have consistently been viewed with a certain level of disdain.11 Many
even contend that we should not care about the homeless, or that the
treatment they are receiving is what they deserve. Why should we care
about the homeless? The United States is a nation based on the principle of
equality. The Declaration of Independence states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
Rehabilitation Single Room Occupancy Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 50,552. (Sept. 30, 2009).
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) establishes FMRs in every locality in each of the
fifty states.
6. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 2, at 2.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Homes Not Handcuffs: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L
COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/criminalization.pdf
(July, 2009), (offering a more detailed analysis of the above summary
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/CrimzReport_2009.pdf).
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.
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unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed . . . .12
The Founders believed that every individual is born with certain
unalienable rights. These rights—often called fundamental rights—are
those rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in
[the nation’s] history and tradition.”13 The Founders believed that these
unalienable rights come from God, our Creator, through Natural Law.14
Throughout the Bible, there are over 2,000 verses that address the issues of
poverty and social justice.15 Many of those scriptures, like Micah 6:8,
include admonitions such as: “[W]hat does the LORD require of you but to
do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?”16
Other verses illustrate God’s heart for the poor: “[L]earn to do good; seek
justice, correct oppression; bring justice to the fatherless, plead the widow’s
cause.”17
This Comment argues that certain cities violate the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution by the particular ways the
cities criminalize homelessness. Therefore, courts should invalidate these
laws, and legislatures should implement more constructive ways of dealing
with the problem of homelessness. This Comment will not argue that the
government has any obligation to provide housing to the homeless or that
the homeless class deserves special benefit rights.18 Instead, this Comment
argues that the government has a duty not to infringe on any individual’s
basic freedom rights as outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment, whether
that individual is homeless or not. Part II presents the history and
development of homelessness in our nation and examines how the homeless
have come to be viewed as a criminal class. Part II also surveys the judicial
response to the criminalization of homelessness. Part III lays out the
12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003).
14. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE 5,000 YEAR LEAP: THE 28 GREAT IDEAS THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 46 (2007).
15. The Bible That Reveals God’s Passion, THE POVERTY AND JUSTICE BIBLE,
http://www.povertyandjusticebible.org.au/index.php (last visited May 1, 2010).
16. Micah 6:8 (English Standard Version).
17. Isaiah 1:17 (English Standard Version).
18. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that the government may not
preclude an individual from exercising his fundamental rights, but government “need not
remove those not of its own creation”).
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problems brought on by the criminalization of homelessness through an indepth analysis of the ways these statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment
in two cities: Seattle, Washington and St. Petersburg, Florida. Part IV then
presents an analytical framework based on the Fourteenth and Fourth
Amendments, examining the issue through the Due Process Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the implied right to travel. Part V concludes
the Comment with an overview of the work being done throughout the
nation to repeal these laws and decriminalize homelessness.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of the Criminalization of Homelessness
Vagrancy laws date back to feudal England, when the Statutes of
Laborers were enacted in response to the depopulation caused by the Black
Death.19 The Statutes of Labourers required every able-bodied person to
work for wages fixed at a certain level.20 These statutes essentially sought
to turn every working class citizen into a serf.21 Under these laws, it was
illegal to accept more than the set wage, to refuse an offer of work, or to
give money to beggars who refused to work.22 In an effort to enforce these
laws, the Act of 1414 gave justices of the peace the power to punish
vagrants.23 Despite the measures taken to criminalize vagrancy, the
homeless population continued to grow.24 Poor work conditions and a lack
of work created an entire class of individuals who became a burden to
society.25 Therefore, laws were enacted that confined those unable to work
to their own town; if they left, they would be forcibly removed, returning
them to the town legally bound to support them.26
In sixteenth-century England, the Slavery Acts mandated two years
imprisonment for any individual who “live[d] idly and loiteringly, by the

19. Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of
Official Efforts To Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 635
(1992).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 23 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1349).
23. 2 Hen. 5, c. 4 (1414).
24. Simon, supra note 19, at 636.
25. Id.
26. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603,
616 (1956).
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space of three days . . . .”27 By the nineteenth century, “the roads of
England were crowded with masterless men and their families, who had lost
their former employment through a variety of causes, had no means of
livelihood, and had taken to vagrant life.”28 The decay of the feudal system
and the deteriorating economy exacerbated the problem.29 The dissolution
of the monasteries under King Henry VIII drastically affected the poor,
taking away the religious institutions that had provided assistance.30
These policies and prejudices carried over to early American law and
helped shape the laws regarding the homeless.31 Paupers and vagabonds
were specifically excepted from the privileges and immunities clause of the
Articles of Confederation: “The free inhabitants of each of these States,
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other State . . . .”32 This constitutes one of the earliest examples in America
of the homeless being explicitly denied the right to travel—a right that the
Supreme Court has since recognized as fundamental.33
In Mayor of New York v. Miln, the United States Supreme Court held
that New York could deny paupers arriving by ship entrance into the
country:
We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide
precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers,
vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the
physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and
infections articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of which
may be laboring under an infectious disease.34
Forty years later, the Supreme Court described government efforts to
exclude paupers as “a right founded . . . in the sacred law of self-defence.”35
Society began to question laws prohibiting homelessness during the Great
27. Mark Malone, Note, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FORD. URB. L.J.
749, 754 n.17 (1982).
28. Ledwith v. Roberts, 1 K.B. 232, 271 (1937).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972).
32. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV (emphasis added).
33. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
34. Mayor v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142-43 (1837).
35. R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877).
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Depression.36 However, no real changes appeared until after World War II,
when federal and state courts across the nation began to strike down
vagrancy laws as void for vagueness.37 Cities responded to these court
decisions by enacting more specific ordinances.38 Courts consistently
upheld these newer ordinances until the early 1990s, at which point some
courts began holding them unconstitutional.39 Today, many of these types
of ordinances are still enforced.40 While these ordinances may not be as
blatantly anti-homeless, the effects are the same—they make basic life
activities necessary for existence on the street illegal.41
B. The Judicial Response to the Criminalization of Homelessness
Pottinger v. City of Miami was the first notable instance that a court
applied the Fourth Amendment to a statute criminalizing homelessness.42 In
Pottinger, a group of homeless individuals challenged the seizure of their
personal belongings and alleged that the City had a policy of harassing
homeless people for sleeping, eating, and performing life-sustaining
activities in public places.43 The district court found that the criminalization
of essential acts performed in public when there was no alternative violated
the plaintiffs’ right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.44 In addition, the court found that the City violated the
plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment.45 The court also found that
approximately 6000 people were homeless in Miami, while there were
fewer than 700 shelter spaces.46 On review, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals referred the case for mediation.47 The parties negotiated a
settlement requiring the City to institute a law enforcement protocol to
36. Simon, supra note 19, at 640.
37. Id. at 642.
38. Id. at 647.
39. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
40. See generally Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9 (noting the ongoing problem of
the criminalization of homelessness).
41. Id.
42. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1569.
43. Id. at 1569-70.
44. Id. at 1583.
45. Id. (holding that the City’s practices constituted an unlawful search/seizure under
the 4th Amendment).
46. Id. at 1564.
47. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 76 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1996).
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protect the rights of the homeless.48 As part of the settlement, the City
agreed to conduct training for police officers, educating them on the plight
of the homeless.49 The City also instituted mandatory procedures for law
enforcement officers to follow when dealing with the homeless to ensure
the protection of the homeless population’s legal rights.50 Finally, the City
set up a $600,000 fund to compensate homeless citizens injured by the
enforcement of the statutes.51
In the 1993 case Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, plaintiffs
challenged the City of San Francisco’s “Matrix” program, a strict
enforcement of a group of ordinances prohibiting homeless activities.52 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of California found
that homelessness is not a status, and therefore rejected the plaintiffs’ claim
that the program punished them for their status in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.53 The court also rejected the claims that the program violated
the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection, due process, and travel.54 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the case was moot
because, under a new mayor, the City had eliminated the Matrix program.55
In Johnson v. Dallas, a 1994 case, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas held a similar group of ordinances
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.56 The plaintiffs alleged that
the ordinances violated their Eighth, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.57 The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction in part, holding that the ordinances punished the status of
homelessness, and as such, violated the Eighth Amendment.58 In dicta,
however, the district court rejected the Equal Protection claims, finding that
the homeless are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class and that the laws were
48. Pottinger v. City of Miami–Negotiations Lead to Settlement Agreement, LAW
LIBRARY–AMERICAN
LAW
AND
LEGAL
INFORMATION,
available
at
http://law.jrank.org/pages/24461/Pottinger-v-City-Miami-Negotiations-Lead-SettlementAgreement.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Jones v. City and County of S.F., 846 F. Supp. 843, 845 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
53. Id. at 853-58.
54. Id. at 858-61.
55. Joyce v. City and County of S.F., 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996).
56. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 347-48 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d in part,
vacated in part 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995).
57. Id. at 351, 358.
58. Id. at 359.
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rationally related to a legitimate state interest.59 On review, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and declared the ordinances constitutional.60 The
Fifth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment applies only after conviction for a criminal offense,
and the plaintiffs in this case had only been cited or fined, not convicted.61
The case was eventually dismissed.62
In 2006, in Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, a
church had invited homeless individuals to sleep on its outdoor property.63
The City of New York forced the homeless to move, despite the fact that
they were sleeping on private property.64 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction preventing the City’s actions regarding the church
property, but denied the injunction as to the public sidewalk bordering the
church’s property.65 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Church’s provision of
sleeping space to the homeless was the manifestation of a sincerely held
religious belief deserving of protection under the Free Exercise Clause.66 As
such, the City’s actions were subjected to strict scrutiny.67 The Second
Circuit also rejected the City’s argument that its actions were necessary to
address a public nuisance, because no evident health risk had been proved.68
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, a 2006 case, is the most recent significant
decision regarding homelessness statutes.69 In Jones, six homeless
individuals brought suit against Los Angeles, challenging arrests made for
violating a statute that prohibited individuals to “sit, lie or sleep in or upon
any street, sidewalk or other public way.”70 The Plaintiffs, relying on
Pottinger v. City of Miami, argued that the ordinance violated the
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution.71
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
2002).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 355-58.
Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 444-45.
Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 101.
Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 572 (2d Cir.
Id.
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id. at 576.
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.18(d) (2011).
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1125.
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The district court rejected the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Pottinger, holding that
the plaintiffs were not a certified class, and granted summary judgment for
the City of Los Angeles following the reasoning in Joyce v. City and
County of San Francisco.72 The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which held that the City of Los Angeles’s treatment of
these individuals—arresting them for sleeping on the streets when there was
no other viable option—constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.73 In October of 2007, the City settled the lawsuit,
agreeing not to enforce the law between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. until 1,250
permanent housing units for the homeless were constructed.74 The
settlement also required that, before any arrests were made for violating the
ordinance, the police officers had to provide adequate verbal warning and a
reasonable time to move.75
III. CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS: THE PROBLEM
While many cities have criminalized the activities associated with
homelessness in recent years, this Comment will focus on two cities that
illustrate the greater national problem—Seattle, Washington and St.
Petersburg, Florida. Other cities, such as Los Angeles, California,76 Atlanta,
Georgia,77 and even Boise, Idaho,78 are implementing similar programs.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 1137.
74. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 35.
75. Id.
76. A 2009 report named Los Angeles the “meanest” city in the United States with
regard to the homeless. Id. at 33. In 2006, Los Angeles enacted the Safer City Initiative, a
program designed to clean up the city. Id. at 34. Los Angeles spends $6 million a year to
implement the Safer City Initiative, but budgets only $5.7 million a year for homeless
services. Id. The Safer City Initiative added fifty police officers to patrol the Skid Row area.
Id. These officers arrest homeless people for crimes like jaywalking and loitering, crimes
that usually go unnoticed outside of Skid Row. Id. at 35. During one eleven-month period,
twenty-four inhabitants of Skid Row were arrested on 201 different occasions, costing the
city $3.6 million for jail time, prosecutors, public defenders, and other court expenses. Id. at
34. While crime in Skid Row has dropped under the Safer City Initiative, the City has not
come through on its promise to provide additional homeless services under the program,
leaving many individuals without any options. Id. Since the implementation of the Initiative,
homeless residents have moved to other areas that cannot supply needed services. Id. One
study estimated that 1,345 people occupied the streets of Skid Row at the beginning of 2006.
Id. One year later, that number had dwindled to 875. Id. While Skid Row’s homeless
population dwindled, the homeless populations of surrounding areas dramatically increased.
Id. While many applaud the Safer City Initiative as a wonderful scheme that has brought
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A. Seattle, Washington
Approximately 2,827 people are unsheltered on any given night in King
County, where the city of Seattle, Washington is located.79 In November of
2007, Seattle implemented a new policy aimed to remove homeless people
from their camps throughout the city.80 Despite the fact that the shelters
throughout the city were at capacity and there was nowhere else for these
people to go, city officials ordered all makeshift shelters destroyed, forced
the residents to move, and destroyed their belongings.81 “Sweeps,” during
which the police force would come through and destroy the shelters and
possessions, happened twice in 2007.82 Announcements were made before a
sweep in November, but several camps were cleared out in the summer
without any notice.83 In the cases where advance notice was given, signs
were posted informing the homeless that they would need to leave the
premises within forty-eight hours.84 Many of these signs also listed an
outdated phone number.85 During the sweeps, after confiscating personal
property, city crews were told to store personal items for up to sixty days
and discard anything worth less than twenty-five dollars.86
hope back to Skid Row, it has merely moved the problems elsewhere, oftentimes
dramatically harming the homeless in the process. Id.
77. In 2007, the City of Atlanta enacted an ordinance outlawing panhandling in heavily
visited downtown areas and anywhere after dark. Id. at 38. “The ordinance also prohibits
panhandling within 15 feet of an ATM, bus stop, taxi stand, pay phone, public toilet, or train
station. . . .” Id. Police officers dressed as tourists to catch people “aggressively begging” in
the prohibited areas. Id.
78. The Boise Police began using bike patrol officers to enforce a strict anti-camping
ordinance in 2007. Id. at 50. Although the number of unsheltered individuals exceeds the
available shelter space, the police have cited hundreds of homeless individuals for violations
of the anti-camping ordinance and a similar disorderly conduct ordinance. Id. In one extreme
instance, a homeless individual was charged with theft for allegedly attempting to charge a
cell phone at a park picnic shelter. Id. Homeless individuals are often arrested for failing to
appear in court for these violations and failure to pay the required fines. Id. Sentences of up
to ninety days have been imposed for violations of the ordinance. Id. Each day in jail comes
with a twenty-five dollar fine for costs. Id.
79. Id. at 81.
80. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 80.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 80.
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A new plan for addressing the homeless in Seattle was announced in
April of 2008.87 According to the plan, twenty shelter beds would be added,
and during the camp sweeps, homeless residents would be given three days’
notice to vacate the area.88 Just a month later, however, a homeless camp in
Queen Anne Park was swept and twenty-one tons of materials were
removed.89
After the demolition of the homeless camp in Queen Anne Park, a group
of homeless individuals in Seattle banded together to create a new tent
city.90 They satirically christened their community “Nickelsville” after
Mayor Greg Nickels, the man largely responsible for the new policies.91
Nickelsville houses from fifty to one hundred people each night.92 The
camp has been housed at several different sites, including churches and
public property.93 Founded with the intention of providing a place where
inhabitants would know they had a guaranteed place to stay, the community
enforces strict rules regarding alcohol, drug use, and other behavior.94
Shortly after Nickelsville’s founding, Mayor Nickels ordered an eviction of
the tent city for “safety and health concerns.”95 At that time, twenty-five
residents were arrested.96 Since then, Nickelsville has moved several
times.97 The group of homeless individuals set up camp, the City raids the
camp, and they move again.98 As recently as September 2009, Port of
Seattle Police entered the tent city and evicted its inhabitants.99 Police
handcuffed twenty-two homeless persons and arrested them for trespassing
on city property. 100 The inhabitants of the tent city have even been evicted

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 81.
90. Patrick Oppman, Tent City Becomes Home in Tough Times, CNN (Apr. 13, 2009,
12:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/wayoflife/03/19/seattle.tent.city.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 81.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Oppman, supra note 90.
99. NICKELSVILLESEATTLE.ORG, http://www.nickelsvilleseattle.org (last visited Feb. 16,
2010).
100. Id.
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from private property such as a church parking lot.101 Nickelsville leaders
continue to look for a permanent location.102
Despite the City of Seattle’s promises to improve, conditions continue to
worsen. Facing a $56 million operating budget deficit for 2010, the King
County Council made cuts across the board.103 The funds allocated to
address homelessness and homelessness prevention (including shelters,
food banks, etc.) were cut from $471,687 for 2009 to $154,000 for 2010.104
Shelters, counseling programs, food banks, and legal services provided for
the poor were stripped of all funding.105 Homeless youth shelters were
completely cut from the budget.106 These organizations will either have to
cease operations or look to other sources for funding.
B. St. Petersburg, Florida
The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty named St.
Petersburg, Florida the second “meanest city” towards the homeless in the
nation in 2009, second only to Los Angeles.107 According to surveys, there
are 6,235 homeless individuals in Pinellas County, the area surrounding St.
Petersburg.108 That figure represents a 20% increase in the Pinellas County
homeless population since 2007.109 Approximately 2,232 of the 6,235
individuals experiencing homelessness are unsheltered, an 82.7% increase
from 2007.110
On January 19, 2007, St. Petersburg police raided two homeless camps
after giving residents a week’s notice to vacate the premises.111 During the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Chris Grygiel, King County Could Cut All Human Services Funding,
SEATTLEPI.COM (Sept. 27, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/
410589_budget28.html.
BUDGET
RESTORATION
(2009),
available
at
104. COUNCIL
http://blogs.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/Council%20Budget%20Restoration.xls.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 3.
108. Complaint at 7, Catron v. St. Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-00923-SDM-EAJ (M.D. Fla.
May 20, 2009).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Abhi Raghunathan, Homeless Fight Back with High Tech, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
(Feb. 2, 2007), http://www.sptimes.com/2007/02/02/Southpinellas/Homeless_fight_
back_w.shtml.
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raid, police used box cutters to slash and destroy tents,112 earning St.
Petersburg a new nickname: “a national poster child for cruelty against the
homeless.”113 In December of 2007, Catholic Charities established a new
tent city called “Pinellas Hope” in the outskirts of the city.114 Since that
time, local government has taken on part of the burden of running the
camp.115
In early 2007, St. Petersburg passed six new ordinances that essentially
criminalize homelessness.116 These ordinances prohibit panhandling,117
sleeping on sidewalks or streets,118 sleeping near private property,119 lying
on streets or sidewalks during the day,120 constructing any temporary
shelter,121 and storing personal property in public places.122 Since the
passage of these ordinances, police officers regularly conduct sweeps
throughout the city with signs instructing the homeless that they have
thirty-six hours to remove their belongings from public property.123
Removing personal belongings to other public property does not satisfy the
requirement.124 After thirty-six hours, the property is confiscated and taken
to a storage facility where, after thirty days, it is destroyed.125
The situation in St. Petersburg has escalated to the point where Bob
Dillinger, the Pinellas-Pasco public defender, has refused to extend a
contract with St. Petersburg and will no longer represent indigent people
arrested for violating municipal ordinances.126 Dillinger’s refusal was in
112. For video footage of this incident, visit St. Petersburg Police Cutting Up Homeless
Tents, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrPdZmPB36U (last visited Apr. 27,
2011).
113. Raghunathan, supra note 111.
114. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 36.
115. David DeCamp, Vote Favors $300K Infusion for Pinellas Hope Tent City for
Homeless, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Nov. 15, 2009), http://www.tampabay.com/news/
localgovernment/vote-favors-300k-infusion-for-pinellas-hope-tent-city-forhomeless/1051309.
116. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 11.
117. ST. PETERSBURG CITY CODE § 20-79 (2009).
118. ST. PETERSBURG CITY CODE § 20-74 (2009).
119. ST. PETERSBURG CITY CODE § 20-75 (2009).
120. ST. PETERSBURG CITY CODE § 20-82 (2009).
121. ST. PETERSBURG CITY CODE § 20-76 (2009).
122. ST. PETERSBURG CITY CODE § 8-321 (2009).
123. Complaint at 22, Catron v. St. Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-00923-SDM-EAJ (M.D. Fla.
May 20, 2009).
124. Id. at 16.
125. Id. at 22; ST. PETERSBURG CITY CODE § 8-321 (2009).
126. Abhi Raghunathan, Public Defender Will Stop Working Homeless Cases in St.
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response to excessive arrests of homeless people throughout the city.127
According to Dillinger’s office, 676 of the 879 people arrested for violating
these municipal ordinances were homeless individuals from the city of St.
Petersburg.128
The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty has filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
on behalf of several homeless individuals who have been cited or arrested
for violating one or more of the ordinances prohibiting homeless conduct.129
The first of the plaintiffs, Anthony Catron, was issued a trespass warning on
August 23, 2006, which stated that Catron would be subject to arrest if he
was found anywhere in a city park.130 This warning is in place
permanently.131 On August 29, 2007, an officer issued another trespass
warning to Catron—this time, it applied to all public property in St.
Petersburg, and would be in effect for one year. Neither warning
specifically stated the violation cited.132 These warnings apply “curb to
curb,” so that several public sidewalks are included.133
Charles Hargis, another plaintiff in the case, was also issued two trespass
warnings and arrested for being present in a park when it was open to the
general public.134 One of the warnings was to be in effect for two years.
Hargis was also issued a “Notice to the Owner and All Persons Interested in
Affected Property,” a notice which required Hargis to remove his personal
belongings from public property.135 The ordinance prohibiting public
storage of personal belongings specifically states, “moving the unlawfully
stored items to another location on public property shall not be considered
to be removing the item from public property . . .” making it impossible for
Hargis to have his belongings with him in any public place.136

Petersburg, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.sptimes.com/
2007/01/31/Southpinellas/Public_defender_will_.shtml.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Complaint at 2-3, 9-10, Catron v. St. Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-00923-SDM-EAJ
(M.D. Fla. May 20, 2009).
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 12.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Complaint at 15.
136. Id.
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Another homeless plaintiff, Ferdinand Lupperger, was also issued a trespass
warning prohibiting his presence in St. Petersburg public parks.137 A week
later, Lupperger was arrested for being present in a public park, despite the
fact that the park was open to the public at the time.138 The report does not
state the underlying violation.139 The other plaintiffs in the case were cited
for similar violations.
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO BE HOMELESS
This Comment seeks to demonstrate that laws criminalizing
homelessness violate the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and should therefore be invalidated by the courts and
repealed by the legislatures.
A. The Constitutional Framework
1. The Fourteenth Amendment
Three important doctrines are found in the Fourteenth Amendment: Due
Process, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection.140 Working
together, these concepts guarantee each individual procedural protection of
his fundamental rights.141
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
before a State deprives a person of life, liberty, or property, the State must
give that person notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.142
Due process is meant to protect each citizen’s fundamental rights, which
consist of any “fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in
the very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of
such a government.”143 To determine whether a person has been deprived of
due process, courts must answer two questions. First, the court needs to
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. Id.
142. Id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
143. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
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determine the nature of the interest.144 The Supreme Court has held that to
determine whether due process requirements apply, courts must look “not
to the weight but to the nature of the interest at stake.”145 Second, after a
court has determined that the nature of the interest requires due process, it
then must determine the type of notice required.146 The Supreme Court has
put forth three factors to determine the type of notice due in a given
situation: the individual’s interest in retaining his property, the risk of error
through the procedures used, and the government’s interest, including costs
or burden of the additional process.147
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment directs that
“all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”148 However, the
states still have the power to classify people groups as long as its action
survives judicial scrutiny.149 The Court uses three standards to judge
whether classifications are valid: minimal scrutiny, strict scrutiny, and
intermediate scrutiny.150 Under the default minimal scrutiny standard
(rational basis), which is the lowest level of review, “legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”151 Legitimate state
interests include exercises of enumerated police powers, through which the
state acts to protect the public health, welfare, morals, and safety of its
citizens.152 The strict scrutiny standard, which is the highest level of review,
is applied when a statute involves a suspect classification or violates a
group’s fundamental rights.153 Under that standard, the classification is
presumed invalid and the state must prove it is valid.154 The state must
prove that the classification promotes a compelling governmental interest,
144. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
145. Id.
146. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
147. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 321.
148. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citation omitted).
149. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979).
150. Johnson v. Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 351-52 (1994).
151. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citing
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981); U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
152. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1446 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “state police power”).
153. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 352 (quoting Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.
1993)).
154. Id.
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and that the statute is narrowly tailored such that there are no less restrictive
means available to achieve the desired end.155 The third standard,
intermediate scrutiny is a middle standard that focuses on whether a
particular government action is “substantially related to a legitimate
government interest.”156 Intermediate scrutiny is most often applied to cases
involving quasi-suspect classifications.157
There are two ways to evaluate legislation under Equal Protection
analysis: either looking at it on its face or looking at its underlying
purpose.158 When evaluating a statute facially, courts consider the text of
the statute itself.159 If the text of the law is facially discriminatory, it will be
struck down as invalid.160 If the text of the law is neutral on its surface, an
individual challenging its constitutionality must prove that the law was
enacted with a discriminatory purpose in mind.161 Under this discriminatory
purpose analysis, courts look to the function of the law in specific instances
to determine if it has been applied with a discriminatory purpose.162 In
Crawford v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court stated, “Under
decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still may be
unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”163
In Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, the Supreme Court held
that the freedom to travel is a fundamental right secured by the Constitution
through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.164
Freedom to travel from state to state and to enter or live in any state is a
“virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us
all.”165 In a 1969 case, Shapiro v. Thompson, the Supreme Court stated that
the Court had “long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union
and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441).
157. Id.
158. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 536, 543-44 (1982).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 536.
161. Id. at 544.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901 (1986) (quoting Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (citation omitted)).
165. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969).
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restrict this movement.” 166 The Court held that any State action that
attempted to restrict such movement was “constitutionally
impermissible.”167 In Shapiro, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the
government action inhibiting the right to travel.168 While the right to travel
had traditionally been found implicit in the text of the Equal Protection
Clause, in Saenz v. Roe the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause to explicitly protect the
right to travel.169 Viewed as a whole, the case law regarding the right to
travel indicates that, whether the right comes from the Equal Protection
Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, there is a fundamental right
to travel which, when infringed upon, triggers strict scrutiny analysis.170
2. The Fourth Amendment’s Right to Privacy
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
each individual the right to privacy in his person and personal property.171
The Court has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment’s right to
privacy is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause.172 The Supreme Court summed up the
principle in Wolf v. Colorado: “The security of one’s privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment—is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the
concept of ordered liberty’ and as such enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause.”173
The Supreme Court has put forth a two-fold test to decide uncertainties
regarding the right to privacy. First, an individual must have a subjective

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 629.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999).
Id. at 499.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
172. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1949).
173. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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expectation of privacy.174 Second, that expectation must be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.175 When these two requirements are
met, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the state from infringing upon a
citizen’s right to privacy.176 This right to privacy does “not vanish when the
search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a
hotel room . . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”177 An individual’s
property has been “seized” when there is some meaningful interference
with that individual’s possessory interests in the property.178
Twenty-five years after the Supreme Court established this privacy test,
the Eleventh Circuit applied this standard to homeless individuals in
Pottinger v. City of Miami, holding that homeless individuals have the
required legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal belongings.179
B. Applying the Constitutional Framework
1. Seattle, Washington
The City of Seattle, in expelling citizens from tent cities and destroying
their property, violated the homeless persons’ rights to due process. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that before a
person is deprived of life, liberty, or property, he must be given notice of
the case against him and opportunity to meet it.180 In determining whether
government actions regarding homeless activity violate procedural rights,
the Supreme Court’s two-question due process analysis should be applied.
First, the nature of the interest must be determined.181 In Poe v. Ullman,
Justice Harlan considered the scope of the rights guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause:
This “liberty” is not a series of isolated points pricked out in
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and
religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 359.
Soldal v. Cook Cnty, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.

294

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:275

continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . .
and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.182
In other words, Harlan was suggesting that fundamental rights are not
simply a list of rights found in the text of the Constitution, but include more
broadly other rights that are so naturally fundamental as to demand a
heightened level of scrutiny. In the Seattle tent cities, the interest at stake is
the right to privacy in personal property—a right to freedom from arbitrary
impositions. While a right to privacy is often found implicit in the
Constitution,183 even if it is not, it is one of those rights necessary to be free
from “arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints”184 and is therefore
fundamental.
In conducting the camp sweeps, the police destroy not only the
inhabitants’ temporary shelters, but also much of their personal property.185
The Fourteenth Amendment specifically states that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law.186 The Fourth Amendment
deliberately guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects . . . .”187 The right to privacy in personal
belongings is specifically addressed within the Constitution itself, and
certainly qualifies as a principle “inherent in the fundamental idea of liberty
itself.”188 The United States is a nation founded on personal property
interests.189 Therefore, the homeless individuals’ privacy interest in their
personal property is a fundamental right specifically protected by the Fourth
Amendment. The seriousness of the loss of this property cannot be
emphasized enough; these people have nowhere else to go or to store their

182. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
183. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965) (holding that there is a
general right to privacy which emanates from the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
184. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
185. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
188. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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belongings.190 Because shelters are at capacity, their only option is to find
refuge in tent cities.191
Second, if it is determined that the nature of the interest requires due
process, the type of required notice must be determined.192 To determine the
type of notice required, the Supreme Court has prescribed three factors: the
individual’s interest in retaining his property, the risk of error through the
procedures used, and the costs or burden of the additional process.193 The
inhabitants of the tent cities have a great interest in retaining their
property—these possessions are all that they own. Also, there is a very high
risk of error in the current procedure. Without any investigation into the
reason for the violation or the availability of alternate storage, innocent
individuals’ property may be destroyed. The City of Seattle, at times, has
failed to provide notice to the homeless population of upcoming sweeps.194
This type of notice would not be difficult to provide—it has already been
provided in some circumstances.195 Were a court to apply this framework,
considering these three factors together and balancing each party’s interests,
it seems to be a logical conclusion that these sweeps and the destruction of
personal property violate the fundamental right to due process.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court put forth a test to determine
when an individual’s right to privacy is protected by the Fourth
Amendment.196 Under Katz, so long as the Nickelsville inhabitants have a
“reasonable” expectation of privacy in their personal belongings, these
government sweeps violate the homeless individuals’ rights.197 When the
Eleventh Circuit held that homeless individuals do have a legitimate,
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal belongings, the court
was referring to homeless individuals on the street.198 The inhabitants of
Nickelsville live in a fixed, semi-permanent location.199 They conduct all of
their daily living activities in this place, and are part of a larger
190. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 80.
191. Id. at 80-81.
192. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
193. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
194. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 80.
195. Id.
196. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
197. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
198. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571-72 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
199. NICKELSVILLESEATTLE.ORG, http://www.nickelsvilleseattle.org (last visited Feb. 16,
2010).

296

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:275

community.200 Surely, if people on the street have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in their personal belongings, these homeless individuals continue
to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal belongings
when those possessions are stored in a semi-permanent structure inside of a
larger community. If the right to privacy in these items is determined to be
valid, the city’s actions in confiscating personal property constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizures.
The Supreme Court, in Payton v. New York, held that “[t]he seizure of
property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively
reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property
with criminal activity.”201 This concept is related to the “open fields
doctrine,” which holds that the special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to citizens in their persons, houses, papers, and effects does not
extend to the open, public areas.202 Some may argue that, because these
individuals are in public places, the open fields doctrine applies and their
right to privacy no longer applies. The difference here is that these
individuals, in most instances, are not suspected of any criminal activity
other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time. In conducting the
sweeps, Seattle police did not seize personal belongings as evidence of
some greater crime; the homeless individuals’ possessions were seized
simply because they were on public property. Furthermore, application of
the open fields doctrine in this case conflicts with the very purpose of the
Fourth Amendment as outlined in Katz: “[T]his effort to decide whether or
not a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’
deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”203 The physical boundaries of the
home are protected in order to prevent intrusion into the “privacies of the
life within.”204 As Justice Harlan stated in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its preeminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life
is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
205
Constitutional right.
The right to privacy, universally considered fundamental, prevents the
government from seizing personal property without just cause.
Equal Protection guarantees that “all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.”206 In the case of Nickelsville, the Mayor developed a
specific plan to address the homeless.207 This plan included police sweeps
of homeless tent cities in order to demolish temporary structures and
destroy individuals’ personal property.208 This law was put in place to affect
the homeless and no one else. Therefore, it is discriminatory on its face.
However, the states still have the power to classify people groups as long as
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.209
The City of Seattle asserts that the sweeps and ordinances are in place to
preserve the health and welfare of the city.210 On its face, this is a legitimate
government interest; the City of Seattle is exercising its enumerated police
power in order to protect its citizens. However, the means implemented are
not rationally related to the interest at hand—destroying a homeless
individual’s personal property does not protect any citizen’s health or
welfare, and only injures the homeless individual. Therefore, these sweeps
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Some would argue that these individuals’ personal property has no value
and is in fact nothing more than an assortment of trash collected from the
street. In some instances, these belongings may in fact be hazardous to
public health. However, the Fourth Amendment does not protect an
individual’s property from being seized so long as it has some objective
value.211 In fact, the Amendment is deliberately broad: it protects “persons,
houses, papers, and effects.”212
As citizens of the United States, the homeless inhabitants of Nickelsville
have a valid privacy interest in their personal belongings, despite the value
or location of those belongings. When the government came in, without
205. Id.
206. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
207. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 81.
208. Id.
209. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979).
210. Id.
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
212. Id.
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notice, and decided to summarily seize and destroy everything these
individuals owned, it violated these individuals’ constitutional rights of due
process, privacy, and equal protection.
2. St. Petersburg, Florida
Because an analysis regarding the personal property issues would be the
same in St. Petersburg as in Seattle, the analysis of St. Petersburg will focus
on the trespass warnings issued to various homeless individuals. Trespass
warnings prohibiting presence in any city park have been issued to several
homeless individuals, often without notice of the underlying violation.
Some of these warnings prohibit an individual from entering a city park for
a year, while others prohibit any entrance indefinitely.
To determine whether the trespass warnings violate the Due Process
Clause, the Supreme Court’s two-question analysis should be utilized. First,
the nature of the interest must be determined. Upon examination, it
becomes apparent that the interest at stake here is very much a fundamental
right. These individuals are being deprived of their right to freedom of
movement and travel, a right implicitly found in the Constitution and
generally considered to be fundamental.213 Whether the fundamental right
to travel is found in the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, it is indeed a fundamental right which, when infringed
upon, subjects a government action to strict scrutiny.214
Second, after the court finds that the nature of the interest requires due
process, it must then determine the type of notice required.215 Three factors
to determine the type of notice due are: the individual’s interest in retaining
his right, the risk of error through the procedures used, and the costs or
burden of the additional process.216 The state’s interest, the public health
and welfare, does not exceed the homeless individual’s personal interest in
being allowed to exist in public areas. The risk of error is great because
homeless individuals who do not purposely violate any ordinance or do not,
in fact, violate any law may be banned from public areas for indefinite
periods of time. The St. Petersburg police provide notice to the homeless
through the issuance of the warnings themselves. However, that notice is
not sufficient. No hearings are scheduled, and many of the individuals
issued citations do not understand the full import of the situation. Without
any procedural protection of the right to exist in public places, the homeless
213.
214.
215.
216.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
Id.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
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of St. Petersburg will continue to be pushed out of public areas and receive
citations for violation of trespass warnings. Fines accompany every citation
and these individuals cannot afford to pay and criminal records these people
cannot afford to accumulate. The ordinances themselves perpetuate
homelessness because by criminalizing activities these people must engage
in to survive, the city is making it virtually impossible for the homeless to
find work or permanent housing. Few employers are willing to hire those
with long criminal records, and few landlords are willing to rent to those
with unfortunate financial and criminal backgrounds.
All citizens have the right to “travel throughout the length and breadth of
our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict.”217 Yet these trespass warnings prohibit a class of
individuals from traveling in public areas, even when these areas are open
to the non-homeless public. Because the right to travel is fundamental,
government actions affecting this right are subject to strict scrutiny
review.218 The state must prove that the action promotes a compelling
government interest, and that the statute is narrowly tailored such that there
are no less restrictive means available to achieve the desired end.219 St.
Petersburg’s alleged objective is protecting the public health and welfare.
While the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the public
health and welfare, that has not been considered a compelling government
interest. The Court has not established a bright-line test for whether a
government interest is compelling, but it usually involves some level of
necessity.
Even if St. Petersburg’s objective in issuing trespass warnings
constituted a compelling government interest, there are certainly less
restrictive ways of accomplishing the same goal. Prohibiting an individual
from entering any public park or any public area for a year or longer is an
extreme measure. Several of the plaintiffs in Catron were prohibited from
entering any public area for a year or more.220 Therefore, prohibiting these
homeless individuals’ entrance into any public area is a violation of their
fundamental right to freedom of travel.
Although the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that “all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike,” 221 the officers enforcing the
217. Id.
218. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999).
219. Johnson v. Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 352 (1994).
220. Complaint at 10-21, Catron v. St. Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-00923-SDM-EAJ (M.D.
Fla. May 20, 2009).
221. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
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trespass warnings in St. Petersburg are targeting a specific class—the
homeless. Because homelessness is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
minimal scrutiny applies.222 Therefore, if St. Petersburg can prove that the
practice of issuing trespass warnings to homeless individuals is rationally
related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the public health
and welfare, this practice would not violate the Equal Protection Clause,
even though it appears to violate the fundamental right of homeless people
to freedom of travel.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of homelessness and its criminalization is decidedly mixed.
Throughout the last fifty years, some courts have held statutes criminalizing
homelessness constitutional, while others have struck them down on a
variety of grounds. While in some cases these laws are struck down as
unconstitutional, the real problem lies in the way these cases almost always
end. Many times, after a court hands down a decision unfavorable to a city
and its actions concerning the homeless, a city will offer the homeless
plaintiffs generous settlements in exchange for vacating the adverse
judgment.223 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit decision Jones v. City of Los
Angeles would have gone a long way toward shifting the tide regarding the
criminalization of homelessness, but that decision was vacated after the
parties reached a settlement.224 Pottinger v. Miami, another case which
could have had even greater effects in this area of the law were it not
settled, ended with an agreement in which the city implemented training for
law enforcement and set up a $600,000 compensation fund for injured
parties.225
The problem of homelessness is one that affects virtually every city
throughout the nation. Organizations like the National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty, the National Coalition for the Homeless, and
many others have been working with homeless individuals in an effort to
end homelessness. Some cities have set up initiatives to provide housing for
those in need: for instance, Portland, Oregon has implemented a program
where city funding enables outreach agencies to offer permanent housing to

222. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 352.
223. See, e.g., Jack Noldon, Judge Approves Multi-million Dollar Settlement with Fresno
Homeless, KSEE NEWS (June 6, 2008, 4:50 PM), http://www.ksee24.com/news/local/
19609404.html.
224. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
225. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 111.
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people while they work to find employment.226 Private organizations have
also been able to reach out to the homeless in order to improve their plight.
In St. Petersburg, a new initiative called “Project Homeless Connect” was
launched on January 30, 2010.227 Through this project, about 1,200
homeless individuals received medical care, job and housing assistance,
legal services, and other personal services.228 As part of the initiative,
Pinellas County held the state of Florida’s first “Homeless Court,” through
which the county hopes to settle minor criminal cases with homeless
defendants.229
Things are slowly improving, but this issue will not be put to rest until these
laws are completely eradicated. Instead of criminalizing homelessness and
pushing those in the greatest need deeper into poverty, Americans need to
band together and do something to address the homelessness pervading
their cities. After all, in a country founded on the doctrines of equality and
liberty that is the least we can do.
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